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Aboriginal art as exotica: ethnographic or contemporary? 
How best to approach contemporary Aboriginal art of traditional communities?  It 
continues to be a vexed issue for the European-devolved discipline of art history in 
Australia.  Anything one might venture to postulate about Aboriginal culture is pre-
empted by considerations of what is permissible and adequate.  As Eric Michaels 
points out, the Aboriginal world is typified by an extensiveness of knowledge and a 
localism in its patterns of authority.  While Aboriginal tradition encourages the 
teaching of cultural knowledge, only some of its Dreaming lore is publicly available, 
much of it is restricted.1 These restrictions and patterns of authority are divided along 
the lines of moiety and clan, with their intricate social subdivisions and cross-
affiliations.  While this difficulty is regularly acknowledged in commentaries on 
Aboriginal art, it is often assumed that an adequate response is not only possible, but 
also readily available.  Yet, any succinct clarification of the term, contemporary 
Aboriginal art, immediately runs into difficulties because it is far from clear what the 
designation, “contemporary”, amounts to in this context.  What is it being contrasted 
with?  The “traditional”?  The “ethnographic”? 
 
So what would an adequate response be?  For some, this would be couched in a spirit 
of reconciliation and of inclusiveness; for others, it amounts to a matter of cultural 
self-preservation, self-representation and self-determination.  From this, two 
competing strategies follow.  The first seeks to admit Aboriginal art into the discourse 
of contemporary art, which often involves a partial or wholesale accommodation of 
Aboriginal art to contemporary Western aesthetic principles and its terminology.  The 
second strategy invokes Aboriginal art as the “other” of Western discourse and 
therefore unable to be incorporated into its framework.  In practice, the art-
professional discourse on Aboriginal art remains uneasy about the implications of 
each and thus tends to oscillate between both these explanations, often even 
conflating them.  
 
This is not to say that the discussion of these issues is simply hazy or undeveloped.  
To enter this discussion is to enter directly into heated and controversial debates.  It 
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means placing oneself in the midst of a circumscribed and highly contested arena of 
socio-cultural disputation.  Issues of articulation impinge forcefully upon any 
utterance: what right does one have to speak? On whose behalf? For what reason?  
Here the categories are vividly political: “aborigine”, “art”, “culture”, “law”, 
“media”, “religion”.  The terms differ radically from one culture to another, and it is 
very difficult to sustain any sense of their equivalence.2  A radical discontinuity 
traverses the exchange.  So how is this non-equivalence to be negotiated, and what 
would be adequate to it? 
 
Michaels’s ethnographic research into the use of electronic media at the central 
Australian community of Yuendumu had a surprising impact upon debates 
concerning Aboriginal art, particularly in relation to issues of access, address and 
alterity.  The appeal of his work in the 1980s related to the way that he was able to 
make sense of Aboriginal art in terms of the contemporary art debates about post-
modernism and appropriation.  Michaels interprets Aboriginal culture as a type of 
communications-information system.  For him, this realization provokes awareness of 
a culture where intellectual property is defined according to highly “elaborated 
information systems”: 
 
Knowledge was the currency of Aboriginal life. Its transmission was oral, and face-to-face, 
although within this oral system, mythology expressed itself in dance and graphic design as 
well as in stories and songs, all of which are means of storing and sharing important 
information. 3 
 
Aboriginal societies emphasize mobility due to the scarce resources of the 
environment they inhabit and, as a consequence, intellectual property retains 
preeminence over material property.  From his work at Yuendumu, Michaels could 
confirm the view that Aboriginal society is more process-oriented than product-
oriented, which yielded intriguing insights into how its oral-based communications 
system dealt with modern, reproducible media.  No matter how enticing these insights 
seem, there are major impediments to developing them.  
 
No doubt processes of inscription—song, dance or visual art—remain socially and 
culturally sustaining.  Social reproduction relies upon renewed inscription of the 
Dreaming, which is almost akin to the medium of social continuity and reproduction.  
The perpetuation of the process is central.  Hence, the frequently noted implication 
that issues and considerations of making, or inscription, retain priority in Aboriginal 
appropriations of new media forms, including art, and that they do so at the expense 
of a more familiar Western concern with the completed, finite work and its associated 
notions of individual authorship.  Yet, if Michaels insists that Aboriginal art can be 
viewed as a form of appropriation, he simultaneously signals how far it differs from 
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appropriation art.  Aboriginal art retains different priorities insofar as “the 
conservative ideology of ritual Aboriginal expression, which likewise denies 
originality, …seeks not the appropriation of forms but an impossibly exact 
reproduction through time.”4 
 
Despite this insistence upon an unassailable continuity of tradition—a continuity 
which, in turn, is viewed as culturally and socially sustaining—the labels 
“ethnographic” or “traditional” are the tags that most commentators on Aboriginal art 
eschew as derogatory.  Such identifications remove Aboriginal art practice from the 
complexity of the contemporary and distant it from the contingencies which the 
artists seek to negotiate.  Michaels feared that Aboriginal art would always end up 
being “regarded as exotica.”  Why?  Because Aboriginal art “typically travels from 
the desert to the city on the wheels of constructed mythologies, discourses and socio-
economic pressures which are justified as ‘explaining,’ ‘authenticating,’ 
‘contextualising,’ but [are] really only marketing and mystifying it.”5  It finishes up 
as exotica whenever it is suggested that “some intact arcane authority can be 
transferred directly from Aboriginal elders onto canvasses, which can be purchased, 
owned and hung in European lounges and corporate boardrooms.” 6 The appeal of 
Aboriginal art is, of course, closely tied to precisely this kind of claim, which is likely 
the reason an attached notification or a summary of a Dreaming story is held to be an 
integral aspect of the work—not the least by Aboriginal artists themselves. 
 
This is point where the neat demarcations between traditional and contemporary 
become blurred and the consequences of such delineation become barbed.  In one 
sense, Michaels could not have been proved more correct—the discourses that 
promote Aboriginal art tend to rebound upon it.  Not long after his death, the Cologne 
Art Fair has caused a fuss by twice rejecting the inclusion of Aboriginal art from 
display.  What appears to be at issue in Cologne is whether Aboriginal art should be 
classified as contemporary or ethnographic art.  The first rejection by the Art Fair 
organizers was clear and adamant: they did not accept the submission of the 
Aboriginal work as “contemporary art.”  The organizers instead judged the work to 
be tribal or primitive rather than contemporary Australian art.  This decision flew in 
the face of contrary declarations in Australia where the status of Aboriginal art as 
contemporary art had become an article of faith for its advocates.7  Thus the Cologne 
decision clashes emphatically with the most often repeated explanation for the 
success of Aboriginal art: this being that the work possesses an (at least) outward 
visual affinity with other contemporary Western art forms, particularly contemporary 
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abstraction, and so it can be viewed as contributing to those developments in 
contemporary art.8. 
 
While it might be possible to dismiss the Cologne Art Fair decision as myopically 
Euro-centric or simply a beat-up on the fringe of the flourishing cultural market and 
international recognition for Aboriginal art,9 the decision of the organizers to exclude 
Aboriginal art as ethnographic nevertheless caused a furore because it upset 
assumptions about its contemporary status.  Yet this episode only served to expose 
some of the ambiguities that have long been evident in the critical advocacy of 
Aboriginal art.10  The unanimous, and rather automatic, response from the concerned 
Australian art-professionals has been to reject the “ethnographic” tag outright and to 
insist that the work is genuine contemporary art.  Clearly, the label, “ethnographic”, 
is regarded as a slur on the art.  Djon Mundine’s retort to Cologne, as a key curator of 
indigenous art in Australia, is that “all painting comes from some sort of tradition.”11  
Rather than amounting to a damaging rebuke, Mundine’s reply only complicates 
matters.  The question of an obligation to tradition is not at all a binding criterion for 
contemporary Western artists in the way it still holds for indigenous cultural 
expression.  No doubt a historical inheritance of practices and conventions does 
impact upon contemporary Western art, but these play a role in an ad hoc, disparate 
manner.  Nowhere in contemporary Western art does “tradition” equate to “an 
impossibly exact reproduction through time.”   
 
Michaels’s fear that the justifications of Aboriginal art could rebound upon it was 
proved correct in another sense.  The explanation that transforms the art into a kind of 
exotica is fundamental to its appeal and its explanation: take, for example, the claim 
promoted at the Venice Biennale of 1990 that insisted the works of Rover Thomas 
“projected an immediacy through their media…”12  The arguments that traditionally 
have been used to endorse an expressionist immediacy of gesture are now transposed 
to Aboriginal art in order to highlight the sublime religiosity of the work.  That the 
justification of Aboriginal art as exotica proves so compelling is one of the most 
intriguing aspects of its critical validation.  It appears inescapable.  One can find 
evidence of Michaels himself posing something similar.  In his essay, “Western 
Desert Sandpainting and Postmodernism” (1987), Michaels first asserts that Western 
Desert sandpainting could only be understood within the parameters of the Aboriginal 
philosophy and cosmology, which bars a non-Aboriginal viewer from meaning.  
While such viewers are excluded from meaning, they are nonetheless encouraged to 
perceive meaningfulness. What would be the basis for this comprehension?  Michaels 
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goes on to suggest in this essay that he finally grasped the Warlpiri cosmology by 
conceding that Aboriginal inscription could not be understood in semiotic terms, 
despite his own theoretical disposition:  
 
Nothing in semiotic theory or contemporary scientific philosophy accounts for any such 
ability of phenomena to communicate directly, unmediated, their history and meaning. 
Rationally, I have to reject the possibility, and admit that I have been influenced by my 
reading and other prior associations and information. But I recognized that the epistemic 
problem raised here is precisely the one of such interest to Aboriginal philosophy, and the one 
the paintings themselves attempt to bridge. These paintings make the claim that the landscape 
does speak, and that it speaks directly to the initiated, and explains not only its own 
occurrence, but the order of the world. Perhaps this meditation brings me closer to some 
appreciation than all my other efforts. 13  
 
Here Michaels suggests that the meaningfulness of Aboriginal art can be perceived by 
the uninitiated only if they retreat from their own cultural-intellectual precepts.  The 
quote clearly establishes the intellectual-cultural chasm that Michaels himself strives 
to traverse, although it remains far from evident what it is that the Aboriginal 
paintings, and painters, “attempt to bridge”.  The way Michaels presents the issues in 
this passage can only leave one to conclude that the painters do not attempt to bridge 
any gap of expectation or understanding, but simply aim to confirm the pre-
conceptions of Aboriginal cosmology.  Formulated in this way, one is left to ponder 
whether Aboriginal art will remain unknowable and unfathomable unless one adheres 
to its central philosophical tenet concerning a direct communication through both 
totemic ancestors and the landscape to the initiated.  Is it possible though to accede to 
another culture so fully and so readily in the manner Michaels seeks?  Alternatively, 
is one left permanently disenfranchised from Aboriginal art if uninitiated?   
 
A complicating factor, of course, is that most contemporary Aboriginal art 
production—even from the most remote and traditional of communities—is directed 
toward an uninitiated audience.  How then is the attempt of Aboriginal art to bridge 
the largely incongruous nature of the initiated-non-initiated divide to be understood?  
Michaels, as will be seen, offers two explanations and they depend for their 
difference upon what media he is discussing.  Perhaps one reason that the discourses 
which seek to support Aboriginal art rebound upon it is because they forge a deep 
equivocation, which produces immobility.  If Michaels is correct that an informed 
understanding of contemporary Aboriginal art will derive from acceding to the view 
of ritual expression as a direct transmission through “an impossibly exact 
reproduction through time”, then we come back to square one and must concede that 
the exotic and ethnographic account of Aboriginal art will never be far from removed 
from its comprehension.  The exotic explanation, as we have seen, is the one 
Michaels most detests.  The exotic explanation relies upon the eternal coherence of 
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the narrative—no break, no fissure, only an eternal present in a perfect accord of 
action and utterance, of inscription and re-inscription.  To accede to the Aboriginal 
ritual viewpoint of a primordial continuity is no guarantee of a just outcome.  It is 
precisely this form of explanation that permeates Bruce Chatwin’s The Songlines 
(1987), perhaps the most vividly exotic account of Aboriginal culture offered to an 
international readership.  No doubt, for this reason, Chatwin’s book held a macabre 
fascination for Michaels because it too postulates this enduring coherence.  Yet 
Chatwin, unlike Michaels, is not concerned with any politics of Aboriginal self-
determination, nor with acceding to the “other”, because The Songlines appropriates 
Aboriginal culture in order to, as Michaels puts it, establish Chatwin “himself—rather 
than the Aborigines—as the ‘other.’”14  
 
 
Missing the primordial 
The Songlines recounts Chatwin’s visit to Central Australia in an effort to discover 
what he can learn of the “songlines” of the Aboriginal people.  In blurring the 
boundaries between anthropology and travel writing, Michaels suggests that 
Chatwin’s book warrants critical attention by virtue of its “para-ethnographic” 
status—it both partakes of anthropological discourse and denies any association with 
it.  This denial of its debt to anthropological sources has now come full circle, 
Michaels continues, because the book quickly won critical acknowledgement as part 
of a “new generation of travel-writing that has attracted not only considerable literary 
respect but some anthropological interest as well.”15  
 
Chatwin’s skill in The Songlines lies with his ability to offer enticing aesthetic 
analogies for all that he comes across.  This tactic proved so seductive that, again in 
another odd boomerang effect, the German painter Anselm Kiefer came to Australia 
regurgitating Chatwin’s aesthetic-anthropological collage in quasi-mystical tones.  
Yet Chatwin’s work summons up a mood of adventure as much as it does one of 
piety.  The mood is reminiscent of a world forged on Kipling, Empire and cricket; an 
ambition to fulfil some noble undertaking and to test one’s limits at the fringes of the 
world.  Chatwin, of course, is a nomadic explorer in era when the globe has been 
thoroughly explored.  The Songlines evidences this in a peculiar way for the 
encounter with tribal Aboriginals in outback Australia comes regularly furnished with 
odd, increasingly absurd, European points of validation.  The book is as much a 
discovery of this cultural validation as self-validation.  Chatwin seeks to encounter 
the nomadic other and what he discovers is the true, enduring remnants of European 
learning and culture resounding from its most extreme outposts.16   
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One of the key tensions of the narrative in The Songlines, not unexpectedly, revolves 
around an attempt to journey to the heart of an elusive belief system and of having to 
confront it second-hand by means of interlocutors.  Chatwin wants to discover for 
himself—“and not from other men’s books”—what a songline amounts to.  Almost 
immediately, he concedes that he can never “get to the heart of the matter,” and thus 
we find him enlisting the aid of a long list of intermediaries. (12) For Chatwin, as a 
self-styled “icon of the archetypal wanderer” (as Michaels characterizes him), the 
mediated status of his access proves irksome, yet he pushes on regardless in search of 
his primordial, “nomadic pastoralists”.17  Chatwin wants to remain unencumbered 
and free of burden in his quest.  He clarifies that his chief ambition is to return to his 
pet project, a book on nomads, though he states that this too will only be possible 
“…somewhere in the desert, away from libraries and other men’s work.” (75)  
 
An intellectual nomad, Chatwin cannot countenance any baggage, nor does he stop to 
consider the discrepancy between finding out for himself and enlisting the support of 
a host of intermediaries.  Chatwin readily acknowledges that his inspiration for The 
Songlines is the anthropological work of T.G.H.Strehlow, who coined the term, 
songlines, for the Aboriginal Dreaming Tracks.  Strehlow, Chatwin admits, is not a 
figure devoid of controversy because he was accused—by “activists”, as Chatwin 
notes in scare-quotes—of “stealing the songs, with a view to publication, from 
innocent and unsuspecting Elders.” (69) Chatwin would like to play down all this 
recrimination, yet the anthropological enterprise in Australia does carry a lot of 
theoretical-political baggage.  Its legacy, as Robert Hodge makes clear, does indeed 
betray a very heavy burden: 
 
…the English invasion of Aboriginal Australia consisted of a direct assault on all the material 
and cultural conditions of Aboriginal life, including both political oppression and cultural 
genocide. This assault was also accompanied from the start by what seemed like its opposite, 
a strategy of recuperation that expressed regret for the physical injustice and attempted to 
collect and preserve instances of the brutalised language and culture (along with material 
remains like skulls and skeletons). The discipline of anthropology in Australia arose out of 
this second ideological enterprise, whose oppositional role from the outset was framed by its 
overall complicity in processes of domination.18 
 
The outcome of this legacy, Hodge asserts, is “Aboriginalism”, a discourse that 
positions the indigenous population in perpetual exile from “civilized” culture.  Yet 
this outcast status becomes the source of their authenticity as a culture, one 
thoroughly contained in their own discrete realm.  This authentic “Aboriginality” 
remains “incommunicable and incomprehensible for ordinary non-Aboriginals” and 
thus their culture needs to be mediated by privileged interpreters such as 
anthropologists.  
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If Chatwin has an inkling of the burden of this heritage, his disingenuous response is 
to pursue a different response entirely—one not as tarnished, but rather innocently 
wondrous.  Strehlow is a misunderstood visionary who delved into something 
profound.  He aimed to show no less than: 
 
…how every aspect of Aboriginal song had its counterpart in Hebrew, Ancient Greek, Old 
Norse or Old English: the literatures we acknowledge as our own. Having grasped the 
connection of song and land, he wished to strike at the roots of song itself: to find in song a 
key to unraveling the mystery of the human condition. It was an impossible undertaking. He 
got no thanks for his trouble.(69) 
 
Chatwin is clearly drawn to Strehlow’s “impossible undertaking,” but with an 
inflection of his own.  A little earlier in the book, Chatwin draws attention to a theory 
that the first language “was in song.” (55) Then, in outlining his thesis about nomads, 
he portrays the desert as the primal font of humanity: “Man was born in the desert, in 
Africa.  By returning to the desert, he rediscovers himself.” (65) In the desert, the 
burden of history and culture falls away; the true is what is laid bare, naked and 
revealed, uncluttered, in pristine self-reflection.  The sacred, Chatwin makes clear, is 
primordial.   
 
The “impossible undertaking” must be possible after all.  For Chatwin it involves 
trying to find a way to incorporate the cultural specificity of indigenous Australians 
into the most broad and nebulous theory of nomadism possible.  It constitutes merely 
one piece in the overall puzzle.  This incorporation is an essential ingredient in 
developing the mythological package of Aboriginal culture for an international 
readership.  In the Australian outback, Chatwin’s guide, “Arkady”, begins by 
reversing Chatwin’s stated desire of stripping away to unveil the core mystery by 
instead cloaking the core of Aboriginal religious belief, the Dreaming, in analogies 
conducive to Western comprehension.  Hence, from the outset, another tension is set 
in play between finding the secret of the culture in its own terms and accessing it in a 
manner that is clear and of value to Chatwin and his own cultural precepts (or that of 
his intended readership). Arkady likens the Dreaming to poesis, and then proceeds to 
outline a religious-cultural worldview that is regarded as immutable: 
 
By singing the world into existence, [Arkady] said, the Ancestors had been poets in the 
original sense of poesis, meaning “creation”. No Aboriginal could conceive that the created 
world was in any way imperfect. His religious life had a single aim: to keep the land the way 
it was and should be. The man who went “walkabout” was making a ritual journey. He trod in 
the footprints of his Ancestor. He sang the Ancestor’s stanzas without changing a word or 
note—and so recreated the Creation. (14) 
 
This view is expanded immediately to show that the Aboriginal system of belief is in 
fact highly adaptable and thus able to accommodate the most obscure products of 
Western technology: 
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Aboriginals believed that all the “living things” had been made in secret beneath the earth’s 
crust, as well as all the white man’s gear—his aeroplanes, his guns, his Toyota Land 
Cruisers—and every invention that will ever be invented; slumbering below the surface, 
waiting their turn to be called. (14) 
 
This flexibility can account for the most complex and disparate phenomena, as is 
further explained: 
 
Any species…can be a Dreaming. A virus can be a Dreaming. You can have a chickenpox 
Dreaming, a rain Dreaming, a desert-orange Dreaming, a lice Dreaming. In the Kimberleys 
they’ve got a money Dreaming. (12) 
 
 
One might presume that this account would disturb Chatwin’s quest for a pristine 
vision by implying that the Dreaming encompasses both the primordial and historical.  
The Dreaming Tracks constitute the basis of an extensive communication network 
that today must compensate for, and negotiate, displacements caused by disease, 
forced removal and resettlement, the efforts of Christian missionaries to override 
Aboriginal tradition, as well as massacres.  Michaels, for example, notes the example 
of a Warlpiri community video that incorporates the traumatic Coniston Story 
alongside local mythological events.  The video production thus intersperses Dream-
Time and the historical—the events and site of a massacre of Warlpiri people in 
1929.19  Yet this adaptability can be overstated.   
 
Michaels concedes the conservatism of this cosmology in order to stress that which 
indigenous Australians perceive as fundamental to cultural survival:  
 
The conditions in which a story can be altered or a new story invented are highly regulated, as 
might be expected wherever an ideology of continuity is promoted in oral tradition. …a new or 
invented story threatens the web of narrative that supports the Law. New stories are most often 
explained as variants, as missing parts—forgotten, now rediscovered—of known accounts. 
Inventing too many stories threatens the system as a whole, and is resisted.20 
 
Aboriginal cosmology maintains mechanisms for cultural continuity, and thus seeks 
ways of insulating and preserving itself.  What lies beyond the “Law” must be 
brought into the framework of its cosmology.  The “Dreaming Tracks” mediate 
between present movement and an unimaginable stability (of history) as well as 
between the local and the distant.  Strehlow supports this assertion by explaining that 
the totemic ancestors ranged over both short and long distances.  Because some 
traveled hundreds of kilometres, “the ownership of the myths and songs describing 
these travels was shared out among the various tribal groups through whose territories 
these mythical wanderings were believed to have taken place.”21 
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The outline of Aboriginal cosmology provided in The Songlines actually begins by 
acknowledging its extensiveness, particularly emphasizing the more secular, 
pragmatic understanding of the Dreaming Tracks as a communications-mapping 
system:  
 
Each totemic ancestor, while travelling through the country, was thought to have scattered a 
trail of words and musical notes along the line of his footprints, and…these Dreaming-tracks 
lay over the land as “ways” of communication between the most far-flung tribes. (13) 
 
This explanation seeks to reveal how the Dreaming-tracks yield quite practical 
navigational functions—“both map and direction-finder.”22  Yet, this rather prosaic 
understanding is subordinated in The Songlines to a sense of the elusive, aesthetic 
majesty of the Aboriginal belief system.  It is as if to say that the aesthetic emphasis 
yields a sacred continuity, a universal ambition.  The Arkady-Chatwin interpretation 
conveys a magnificent artistic undertaking akin to an opus of Western music or 
literature—though one composed on the scale of the entire Australian continent: 
 
In theory, at least, the whole of Australia could be read as a musical score. There was hardly a 
rock or creek in the country that could not or had not been sung. One should perhaps 
visualize the Songlines as a spaghetti of Iliads and Odysseys, writhing this way and that, in 
which every “episode” was readable in terms of geology. (13)  
 
These “episodes”, as the text quickly clarifies, are sacred sites. 
 
Rather than being posed as a limit to access, these “episodes” are viewed by Chatwin 
as pieces of a universal puzzle. Where incomprehension occurs, where information is 
restricted, or cultural misalignment occurs, then this is the point where Chatwin’s 
aesthetic analogies come into play.  It is not surprising that the resort to Western 
aesthetic affinities soon results in the annexation of Aboriginal culture to the nomad 
thesis Chatwin gradually outlines in the course of his expedition:  
 
…it struck me, from what I now knew of the Songlines, that the whole of Classical 
mythology might represent the relics of a gigantic ‘song-map’: that all the to-ing and fro-ing 
of gods and goddesses, the caves and sacred springs, the sphinxes and chimaeras, and all the 
men and women who became nightingales or ravens, echoes or narcissi, stones or stars—
could all be interpreted in terms of totemic geography. (117) 
 
Later, Chatwin can envisage the singing of the song from the primordial voice: 
 
…I felt the Songlines were not necessarily an Australian phenomenon, but universal: that 
they were the means by which man marked out his territory, and so organised his social life. 
All other successive systems were variants—or perversions—of this original model. (282) 
 
 
Chatwin interprets the Aboriginal “songlines” as part of a larger spectacle, if not as 
something akin to the spectacle of mediality itself.  And there is some basis for this 
conception in Aboriginal belief and custom.  Howard Morphy notes the example from 
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Arrernte mythology of two ancestral beings in the sky, Ungambikula, “ones who exist 
out of nothing” and who gave shape to partially formed creatures (Inapertwa) and 
thus created humans.  He suggests that the “myths are concerned with the creation of 
something out of nothing. They are Aboriginal models of the Big Bang….”  The 
further back the process is traced, the more “the connections emerge.”23  What is 
mediated, however, is not simply the past and the present, the local and the extensive, 
for the Dreaming as “the Law” imposes a moral imperative.  The first things must be 
made continuous with the last, Fred Myers argues from his study of the Pintupi: 
 
In the Pintupi view, things are as they are—the familiar customs of male initiation, death, 
cross-cousin marriage, sorcery, and burial, for example—were instituted once-and-for-all in 
The Dreaming. Human beings neither made it so nor invented these practices. Like 
everything else of the cosmos, people and their practices are simply part of a single, monistic 
order of existents established long ago. The vital essence of men and women appeared as 
spirits (kurrunpa) from The Dreaming. 
 
 “It’s not our idea…It’s a big Law. We have to sit down alongside of that Law like all 
the dead people who went before us,” Myers quotes Pintupi men. 24  In Aboriginal 
cosmology, the Dreaming, or The Law, transmits Aboriginal people as much as they 
transmit it. For this very reason, and in stark contrast to Chatwin, as Myers suggests 
in another context, indigenous Australians are “precisely those who insist on not 
being displaced.”25   
 
The difficulty for Chatwin is that he reads Aboriginal cosmology as a segment of one, 
generic system.  Viewed this way, it holds the possibility of being enlisted, if not of 
being wholly appropriated, to the aspirations of his universal nomad calling 
(whatever that may entail).  If, however, Aboriginal culture is a process oriented, oral 
communications network, then it does not contain some core feature to be uncovered 
at a single point of access.  It presents instead an intricate web of reciprocal relations 
of information, of rights and responsibilities, of an obligation to maintain and 
perpetuate the Dreaming, a culture and a land.  The complexity that fascinates the 
Arkady-Chatwin portrayal of the Dreaming Tracks is, as Michaels insists, a facet of 
“a complex, utterly precise connection between person, knowledge, and place.”  
Aboriginal societies place their emphasis upon who does the interpreting, who 
maintains the right to know, what place one holds in the kinship network, the right to 
make determinations as new situations arise—all with a view to upholding the culture 
and its values.26  The basic premise about obtaining the answer to the cosmology is 
askew from the outset as Michaels explains: 
 
Posing direct questions is considered extremely rude in terms of Aboriginal etiquette (von 
Sturmer 1981). Traditional people are careful to assure that only senior authorities “speak 
for” specified issues, so that for many questions, an individual will refuse to admit 
knowledge. The researcher may be directed to the proper person, or just ignored, which in 
traditional terms may be a politeness to cover the questioner’s own rudeness. Proper senior 
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authorities, however, demonstrate their authority by maintaining their control of the 
pedagogic dialogue. One is taught in sequence, and the sequence is determined by tradition, 
not the researcher’s desire to fill out a questionnaire or pursue his own research agenda.27 
 
If the transmission of knowledge forms the basis of social status and authority, then it 
is organized according to an elaborate pattern of kinship groupings and moieties.  The 
fact of Aboriginal social organization means that knowledge is stratified and 
allocated circuitously among community members, a factor magnified in the case of 
the uninitiated outsiders.  Strehlow confirms this: “No outside white pressure will 
quicken this revelation. For Aboriginal owners have the sacred duty not to reveal the 
full and final truths of their sacred traditions to unauthorised questioners.”  He goes 
further and reports that, well before Chatwin’s arrival in central Australia, zealous 
inquisitors after secrets could be readily misled: “Ultra-inquisitive intruders are 
commonly fobbed off with untrue stories…as can be readily seen in the large amount 
of fictitious rubbish that is already being retailed by tourist guides (and others) to an 
unsuspecting and gullible public.”28 
 
A corollary of Aboriginal traditional belief is that significance, and thus aesthetic 
appreciation, is assigned in wholly different ways to non-indigenous expectation.  
Strehlow notes how, for example, Uluru (Ayers Rock) may not necessarily pose the 
same significance for indigenous communities in the way it does for tourists.  In fact, 
the site “with the longest ceremonial cycle” is a far less majestic site, the native-cat 
centre, Wapirka: 
 
It cannot be stressed too much or repeated too often that the religious importance of a major 
totemic site in Central Australia was not determined by any spectacular aspects of the 
landscape but purely by the sacred myths, songs and acts that had been attached to it by age-
old tradition. Considered as a major totemic centre, Wapirka, though situated in what might 
be termed a mean and commonplace landscape that few tourists would bother to notice, 
outranked by far Ayers Rock, despite the spectacular scenic magnificence of the latter…29 
 
In the Warlpiri video production of Coniston Story, Michaels witnesses something 
similar as far as incongruous aesthetic expectations go.  The long panning shots in 
this video seem wholly devoid of any significant detail or incident.  Yet, what for one 
audience appears empty is full of significance for another.  Rather than an empty 
landscape, the video is replete with unseen figures, both historical and mythical.  In 
this case, with its intersection of historical and DreamTime events, in Coniston Story 
the camera movements follow police trackers over a hill at one moment, the direction 
of the ancestors at another.   
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Such intrinsic impediments and differing cultural expectations do not rule out cultural 
exchange; in fact, there is an obligation on the part of Aboriginal custodians to 
communicate basic knowledge of their religious structure to others.  But what will be 
the basis for this communication when the basic patterns of disclosure remain at 
odds? Michaels offers a suggestive form of engagement drawn from an example of 
cross-cultural confusion.  In Myers’s study of the Pintupi, according to Michaels, the 
anthropologist misconstrues the motives of a Pintupi elder who showed him sacred-
secret objects.  Myers attributes the elder’s action to a demonstration of personal 
power, prestige and the elder’s willingness to “stay in the area to care for them.”30  
According to Western Desert “discourse strategy”, as Michaels coins it, “demands are 
not directly made.”  The point Michaels makes is that “the old man is not only saying 
who he is, but also, more strikingly, who Myers is.”  Personal power is not all that is 
stake for what is entailed here is the obligation of authority, an obligation that not 
only necessitates restricted (and thereby privileged) access.  An obligation is also 
bestowed to Myers in the showing of the objects: an obligation “to return, to hold and 
to care for the Pintupi.”31  Yet, Myers himself makes a very similar argument in 
relation to Aboriginal painting.  Aboriginal people insist upon not being displaced 
because they value a “sense of connection”.  They do, however, recognize that people 
who do not share this same sense of connection will see their works and objects.  But 
Myers insists that “the revelation of forms to the sight of the uninitiated is a gift that 
carries responsibilities.  In showing their paintings, Aboriginal people may require 
that to have seen something is to be responsible for understanding it in their terms.”  
Of course, Myers’s conclusion is that the works should be seen in Aboriginal terms.  
Although, tellingly, he notes: “Aboriginal people’s expectations that knowledge of 
their culture’s foundation in the Dreaming will result in recognition of their rights are 
not entirely fulfilled.”32 
 
What does all this tell us of the effort to engage with Aboriginal culture on the part of 
the uninitiated, or even semi-initiated, art advisors, art historians, anthropologists, 
media analysts or new age travel writers?  The question that haunts all their discourse 
is whether one can negotiate cultural difference when that engagement is 
characterized by displacement, a pervading sense of intrusion and dealing at cross-
purposes.  How is care to a culture exhibited given this lack of cultural reciprocity?  
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Here we come to a well-known structure.  The “authentic” is that which is found 
within its own parameters.  Therefore, the authentic cultural expression is regarded as 
somewhat, or even largely, dissipated outside of its own parameters (hence the 
argument that Aboriginal art is devalued or violated if the artists are motivated by 
monetary concerns or, to take this to an extreme, even if Aboriginal artwork appears 
on the art market).  Yet, on the other hand, most such approaches implicitly suggest—
one way or another—that such art, even the culture as a whole, gains value when it 
ventures out, or is engaged with, beyond its own parameters, beyond the 
“ethnographic present” for instance.  
 
Art history is caught in this double bind of argument.  Tim Bonyhady, in an essay 
detailing how unjust current Australian museological practices are to Aboriginal art, 
presents an exemplary study of the effort to do justice to cultural difference, while 
showing that it is violated in every attempt to do so.  His suggested alternatives to 
current museology oscillate between two possibilities.  First, that art historians should 
attempt to convey what, for instance, the painting of Emily Kngwarreye “means 
within her community”—thus, he generally gives support to the contention that 
Aboriginal art “…is best interpreted in its own cultural terms.”  Second, art historians 
ought to develop a cross-cultural framework “for exploring Australian art that moves 
back and forth between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal material.”  This latter 
proposal seeks to move away from the discrete compartmentalization of each culture 
under the broad rubric of “Australian art.”  Bonyhady, however, ends up with two 
proposals that appear to sit uneasily, if not clash, with one another.  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that he should suggest that the exhibition of Aboriginal art poses 
a risk and a danger.  It represents a risk because it will be appreciated solely in 
formal-aesthetic terms—a factor that becomes “significant when it is shown by 
itself.”  It presents a danger in that “the symbolic, narrative and political significance 
of these paintings” will be lost entirely—which becomes an urgent issue “when 
Aboriginal art is interposed with non-Aboriginal art.”33  
 
The untenable conclusion is that the public exhibition of Aboriginal art, though now 
unavoidable, presents irreducible dangers, and that the art historian cannot readily 
mitigate the risks involved.  
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Hesitation about the limitations of one’s position as an art historian or ethnographer, 
however, need not prompt an evacuation of that (rebounding) discourse.  It is the 
articulation of this impossible position that allows a certain alterity to emerge, but it 
does not guarantee the comforting assurance of pure access.  This debate goes round 
and round in circles because the presiding assumption is that, within the realm of an 
attempted cross-cultural discourse, there is a true and unsullied mode of access to the 
alterity of the other.  Rather than the other being something out there, always located 
with somebody else, somebody exotic, someone wholly alien, the other could inhabit 
our very own discourse.  As Samuel Weber explains, this would entail a different 
approach, one that is gained only by: 
 
…realizing that and how the other is never simply out there but at the same time very much 
with us and within us can we hope to accede in some measure—and we are always speaking 
here of a more or less, never an absolute: you can never accede fully to the other—to an alien 
people in their specific difference. To contribute to this is, however, something very different 
from claiming metatheoretical status. In fact, it is as far removed from that as possible, since 
it problematizes one’s involvement in rather than one’s detachment from heterogeneous 
processes.34 
 
Weber’s proposal suggests that one can never presume an innocent perspective, one 
without limits, the perspective which grants one a perspective over all other 
perspectives.  It is only to the extent that art historians or ethnographers become 
aware of the manner in which “hidden constraints, presuppositions and practices 
preform their approach to the ‘other’” that, he argues, they will be able “to leave 
room for—and hence take into account—the alterity of the peoples they are seeking 
to study.”  Chatwin presents a provocative example because he touches on and 
presents many of these issues in all their awkwardness and difficulty, yet he 
simultaneously and conclusively denies their relevance to him.  He remains unable to 
place any of his presuppositions at risk and hence he sets himself above these issues.  
It is this boldness and audacity that may appear to set him apart from the hand-
wringing feebleness of art historians and ethnographers—it may even be that the 
example of the blunt crudity of Chatwin’s appropriation prompts their relentless 
introspection—yet the outcome is not that different.  Unable or unwilling to accede 
much to the alterity of Aboriginal culture, Chatwin concedes at one point that he will 
have to resort to glimpsing the unattainable and bafflingly complexity of the 
songlines “by the back door,” just as he imagines Strehlow did so many years 
before.35 
 
 16
The conclusion to The Songlines is therefore quite telling.  The narrative “climax” of 
Chatwin’s The Songlines —the long awaited encounter with tribal Aborigines in the 
Cullen outstation and beyond—is precisely the point where the story unravels.  The 
ultimate confrontation in the visit to the outback turns into a narrative black hole.  It 
is as though Chatwin has plunged into an abyss and that all he has to grasp hold of is 
his jumble of notes from the uncompleted nomad book.  Racing against time and 
mortality, the narrative framework is suspended, or collapses, and page after page of 
Chatwin’s jottings and quotes from the nomad notebooks appear as though transposed 
directly from their moleskin pages.36  A gulf emerges in the narrative at the point 
where Chatwin had sought to discover for himself information about Aboriginal 
Dreaming Tracks.  What he ultimately seeks to find in Aboriginal culture is the 
justification and realization of his own project, which can only prove disappointing 
because it returns in its original form—a scrambled cluster of undigested notes.  
 
 
From cult to exhibition value and back again? 
Whereas Chatwin’s attempted appropriation of Aboriginal culture finishes 
inconclusively, if not in tatters, then an alternative response that posits Aboriginal 
culture as self-consistent in its own autonomy lays equally bereft in that it can offer 
no explanation of how its contemporary cultural expression can convey anything to 
the uninitiated.  The only response the latter approach can offer is that Aboriginal 
culture will undermine its own social-cultural sanctity if it ventures outside its 
boundaries into commodity capitalism, modern individualism and the clutches of the 
tourist-leisure industries.37  This is the basis of Robert Hodge’s dispute with 
Michaels’s approach to these questions.  He accuses Michaels of being complicit with 
“Aboriginalism”; a discourse that seeks the authenticity of that culture within 
circumscribed boundaries as an exotic fossil forever removed from the vicissitudes of 
contemporary life.  
 
This is ironic because Michaels’s work focused upon the seemingly contemporary 
issue of media in Aboriginal culture.  He zeroed in on the discrepancy, but also the 
interaction, between Aboriginal “narrow-cast” communication and the broadcast 
format of electronic media.  His work suggests that the information-based nature of 
Aboriginal societies necessitates a fastidious localism in its patterns of authority so 
 17
that, unlike Western societies, authority is not necessarily transportable.  The 
information systems of Aboriginal communities are characterized by a mobility of 
information exchange, but this does not presuppose a portable authority to transmit 
that information.  What is sacred-secret information in one area may not be so in 
another place.  What is true of one Aboriginal community may not be so of another.  
Michaels was intent to show how an Aboriginal community, such as that at 
Yuendumu, adapted new media according to its own particular, local imperatives, so 
that one might examine the interaction as if the indigenous population had “invented” 
the medium involved.   
 
His insistence on the localism of Aboriginal considerations concerning art and 
media—more precisely, the “continuity of modes of cultural production across 
media”38—was aimed at forestalling appropriations of Aboriginal culture.  It is as if 
Michaels wants to preserve its difference by preventing Aboriginal culture from 
being swallowed up as the latest “primitive” in the Western pantheon of “universal 
culture” or as the latest marginal case in the repertoire of “alternative” histories.  
With his insistence upon the local imperatives of Aboriginal information 
organization, Michaels wants to upset this presumption by revealing that, outside of 
traditional Aboriginal society, one is always an interloper.  
 
Localized considerations became evident to Michaels from the moment he arrived at 
Yuendumu to find that the Warlpiri community had organized a broadcasting 
schedule utilizing videotape.  This was prior to the establishment of full satellite 
services and occurred largely in the absence of broadcast resources.  From the outset, 
viewing and production were organized according to local cultural imperatives.  
Viewing schedules, for instance, announced when men, women or teenagers could 
view broadcasts rather than noting the times of particular programs.  Furthermore, 
Warlpiri cosmology does not distinguish fact from fiction; everything is held to be 
true according to its place in The Dreaming, or “the Law” (Jukurrpa). Characters, for 
the Warlpiris, act according to the perceived behavior of members of their class (kin, 
animal, plant) rather than from personal motivation.  Imported viewing material, such 
as Hollywood videos, may place an emphasis on different aspects of information or 
upon differing modes of delivering it, so that any perceived shortcomings may 
necessitate special audience deliberation:  
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…content (what is supplied in the narrative) and context (what must be assumed) are so 
different from one system to the other that they might be said to be reversed. For example, 
Warlpiri narrative will provide detailed kinship relationships between all characters as well as 
establishing a kinship domain for each. When Hollywood videos fail to say where Rocky’s 
grandmother is, or who’s taking care of his sister-in-law, Warlpiri viewers discuss the matter 
and need to fill in what for them is missing content. (92) 
 
As one might expect, therefore, these considerations permeate production values and 
content.  Michaels intriguingly asserts that, from the evidence of his time spent at the 
Yuendumu community, the Warlpiri community adapted new electronic media to the 
requirements of own belief system in a way they were unable to do with print 
media.39  
 
The presentation of Warlpiri programs at that time took on what Michaels perceived 
to be a rather “Brechtian” form, evidenced by the seemingly loose and erratic manner 
in which Francis Kelly Jupurrurla hosted the viewing schedule as well as the cultural 
references set in play.  He began with: 
 
…reggae music and focuses the camera on his Bob Marley T-shirt draped over a chair. After 
a while he refocuses on the compere’s desk, walks around and into the shot, announces the 
schedule and any news, then walks out of the shot, turns off the camera and switches on the 
VCR. This procedure is repeated for each tape. (38) 
 
The relaxed, if not disjointed, manner of presentation cannot simply be attributed to 
amateur production values.  Michaels takes these seemingly quirky characteristics as 
indicative of other criteria at work.  He wishes to show that at such points the 
differences between cultures become stark.  In short, Michaels aims to show that 
Aboriginal communities are able to utilize new media successfully to their own ends, 
but these ends remain localized and the engagement with such media seeks to secure 
these local priorities.  But what happens, for example, in the shift from paintings 
made for transitory secular or ritual purposes, in which the durability of a work is not 
an issue,40 to paintings made for public exhibition, the market and eventual 
conservation?  Is it possible to utilize an introduced medium solely as if one had 
“invented” it for one’s own purposes?  
 
The privileging of this stance leaves Michaels open to Hodge’s charge that his work 
amounts to “Aboriginalism” in another guise—thus he links Michaels’s work back to 
the fundamental limitations of Western anthropology, art history as well as, 
ironically, Chatwin.  Hodge is dubious about whether the cultural maintenance model 
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favored by Michaels can allow for any indigenous application of, or response to, mass 
communication.  A focus upon localism, for instance, allows little capacity to 
consider the question of Aboriginal media under the broad scope of a satellite 
footprint.  This is a pivotal consideration for a culture in which the arrival of a 
medium, such as acrylic on canvas, is virtually as recent as that of satellite 
transmission.  Michaels’s work, according to Hodge, is “unable to produce an 
indigenous model that is valid for more than one language area.”  For Hodge, on the 
other hand, it is precisely the “leaky boundaries” of Aboriginal language that suggest 
a different model to the “Aboriginalist” discourse of a culture “forever encapsulated 
in a self-contained universe.”41  
 
Hodge’s argument cuts directly to the tensions explicit in Michaels’s work, including 
the traps the latter hoped to evade.  Yet, Michaels’s examination of Aboriginal art 
retains its critical resonance because it is in his writings on art—and not, as one might 
expect, on electronic media—that he begins to address these very dilemmas.  For this 
reason, Hodge is incorrect to deduce that Michaels theorised Aboriginal art “in 
similar terms to the way he analysed video.” It is in his analyses of contemporary 
Aboriginal art that Michaels actually develops his explanation of how Aboriginal 
culture formulates a response to the contrary impetuses of narrowcast and broadcast, 
Dream-Time and Our-Time.  He seeks to achieve this by disproving the assumed 
archaism of contemporary Aboriginal work.  This move leads Michaels to offer a 
very radical, secular understanding of the art.  Michaels’s bold step is to argue that a 
thorough separation of artistic content from ethnographic content occurs in 
contemporary Aboriginal art—a severing, he suggests, that was wholly unfamiliar to 
the anthropology he was taught “not so very long ago.” 
 
Contemporary Aboriginal cultural production both replicates the familiar axioms of 
its culture and looks out onto and through the framework provided by the tele-
technoscientific West. 42  This is difficult for Michaels to substantiate due to his 
emphasis upon promoting, or perpetuating, Aboriginal “cultural and political 
autonomy.” (120)  Everything in Aboriginal society—kinship relations, graphic 
designs, stories, songs, dances—is set in place and has its place.  At the same time, 
Michaels grants this emphasis upon continuity a less inert quality.  He notes that 
issues of secrecy and sacredness are not static in that society, but are part of a 
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“process of dynamic, changing structures.” (87-8) The responsibility to transmit and 
to teach cultural knowledge ensures a certain willingness to engage beyond set 
parameters, even beyond Aboriginal communities and culture, though the idea, as we 
have seen, being that the non-Aboriginal is brought into the obligation of a reciprocal 
relation of care.(141)43  
 
So how is this wholly different attitude to land and property to be conveyed through 
new media, particularly when the conflict between “narrowcast” and “broadcast” 
potentialities are so decisive and the effects so indiscriminate?  Everywhere Michaels 
sees immense difficulties.  Notions of open access and the “free” dissemination of 
information clash with the narrowcast requirements of oral, largely face-to-face, 
transmission of information in Aboriginal cultures.  The fundamental discrepancies of 
access and address between different cultures, as well their differing requirements of 
media, are considerable: the emphasis upon collective expression—as well as the 
insistence upon reproduction—at the expense of inventive authorship; the fact that 
indigenous cultural expression does not adhere to a free speech ethic; the tension 
between the responsibility to convey knowledge of The Dreaming and the right to 
know—hence, plagiarism is not so much a problem whereas thievery, the 
unauthorized appropriation of a design, is. 44  
 
If most of the “discourses and socio-economic pressures” work to turn Aboriginal art 
into a form of exotica, then Michaels attempts to mitigate this tendency by arguing 
that the Aboriginal appropriation of such new media are “counter-appropriative 
strategies.”  His overt ambition is to wrench the resultant works from ethnographic 
context, by which he means “nearly all available discourses claiming ‘tradition’ and 
‘unique authenticity.’”45  Based on work such as Brogus Nelson Tjakamurra’s 
Halley’s Comet (1986) or Njinawanga’s sculpture Carving of Bones (1985), Michaels 
contends that contemporary Aboriginal art is able to “invent contents and forms with 
no sources in local mythology.”  Such artwork is not simply drawn from a ready-to-
hand, pre-ordained template; instead Aboriginal artists devise “a self-conscious 
selection of certain media, themes, stories, calligraphies and materials from a 
conceptual and material palette whose resources and range are only newly available 
to them.”46  If contemporary Aboriginal art amounts to a “counter-appropriation”, it is 
because such work emerges from the contingencies of contemporary circumstances 
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and is forged in the attempt to engage with what is essentially foreign to its traditional 
processes.47 
 
What is at stake in Michaels’s contrary assessment of the prospect of art and of 
broadcast media becomes clear in his differing uses of the verb, to wrench, which 
occurs in separate studies of the two varying media possibilities.  On the one hand, he 
argues that it is only when Western Desert paintings “are separated, wrenched, from 
their ethnographic context” that they can attain critical legitimacy in contemporary art 
and “the Post-Modern debate.”48  Turning to assess the impact of broadcasts of 
electronic media, the implications are found to be quite different and the 
consequences dramatic for the community: 
 
Where Aboriginal information is broadcast, especially when it is broadcast in English, a truly 
subversive and potentially “culturecidal” situation is created. Here the authority for 
“blackfella business” is wrenched from the appropriate local elders and the information made 
freely available to the young.49 
 
The contradictory prospect of wrenching casts a shadow over these counter-
appropriations and the accompanying modes of cultural production that Michaels 
recognizes as occurring across various media.  While Michaels no doubt envisages 
genuine difficulties due to the “indiscriminate” nature of broadcast media, it is 
difficult to concede his point in attempting to ascribe, and isolate, the positive or 
negative effects of wrenching to one particular medium over another.  Equally, it is 
not feasible to assume a “continuity of modes of cultural production across media” in 
any seamlessly consistent manner.  In each instance, one is both wrenching and being 
wrenched.  One both partakes of new media and, by virtue of their de-localizing and 
dislocating impetuses, one is taken, propelled to differing contexts, circumstances and 
effects which cannot be adequately contained or controlled.  
 
Indigenous Australians, however, seek to develop conventions for negotiating these 
unexpected contingencies—and these endeavor to be culturally affirming.  An 
example is that Aboriginal mortuary restrictions prohibit the utterance of a deceased 
person’s name and this often necessitates the destruction of possessions, such as their 
clothing, such is the trauma involved.  This prohibition, of course, now extends to the 
reproduction of a deceased person’s image (in photography and film) or of their 
voice.  The processes of technical reproducibility and public exhibition mean that 
there have been many instances where such reproductions have come back to haunt 
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the present.  Michaels presents the case of the Warlpiri who wished to view a film 
shot almost twenty years earlier of a fire ceremony in order to help revive the 
ceremony.  The senior owners of the fire ceremony faced the difficulty of viewing 
deceased community members and thus came up with the remarkable declaration that 
the “deceased were all ‘in the background.’”  Michaels notes wryly that this did not 
appear the case at all to him, nor did the women concur, so they refused to watch.  He 
suggests though that: “by that pronouncement, the dead were officially 
backgrounded, and the Warlpiri viewers’ perception indeed shifted.” (109)  
 
Vivien Johnson notes a similar set of circumstances at Papunya, the launching pad of 
Aboriginal contemporary art with its development of the acrylic dot paintings.  
Utilizing Benjamin’s distinction between cult and exhibition value, she argues that a 
process of secularization was crucial to the development of this art and its “increasing 
public presentability.”  This transition became crucial when the Papunya artists made 
artworks containing designs that, though they were not secret within their own 
traditions, were perceived as being so for the Pitjanjatjara from the “neighboring” 
tribal lands to the south across the South Australian border.  Due to such objections, 
the unexpected consequences of public exhibition now required some additional 
consideration, prompting the modification of the work exhibited.  This, in itself, is 
not sufficient explanation of the secularizing formal developments occurring in the 
artwork during the 1970s, Johnson asserts, because the opportunities afforded by new 
materials and media itself led to “a wild phase of experimentation.”50  Furthermore, 
ritual demarcations between gender and age were eventually elided as women and 
children began to assist elders in painting the meticulous, but onerous, expanses of 
dot in-fills.  Johnson regards these specific improvisations as inherent consequences 
of the transition from cult to exhibition value in which old frameworks of assigned 
design, activity and control alter and attenuate from ritual practice.  Yet, she also 
alludes to a counter-movement:  
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the art movement has undermined or superseded tribal 
ceremony—on the contrary. It has coincided with the re-establishment and expansion of 
ceremonial life as part of the movement of resettlement of tribal homelands which Europeans 
call the ‘outstation movement’.51 
 
How could this move to what is, in effect, secularization and the attenuation of ritual 
from exhibition serve to reinforce a traditional religious framework?  Johnson, as 
 23
Michaels finds in certain uses of Warlpiri video and television, argues that the 
utilization of the new media of acrylic painting on canvas can be shown to enhance 
ceremonial uses and ritual knowledge.  Again, as is the case with Michaels’s 
research, Johnson is also keen to assert the disjunction between contemporary 
Aboriginal art and a purported ethnographic authenticity.  As is the case with the film 
of the Warlpiri fire ceremony, aspects of ritual information or prohibitions—sacred-
secret material—can be “backgrounded”—that is, either left out completely or 
diluted—in the exhibited artworks.52  Finally, these contrary formulations are held 
together because Johnson, like Michaels, suggests that there are affinities between the 
modes of traditional Aboriginal practices (emphasizing process and production) and 
the tendencies of technically reproducible media, including that of fine art under the 
spell of exhibition value:  
 
…though the notion of producing images of the culture rather the culture itself may be alien 
and even alienating, with respect to tribal traditions, the reproducibility of traditional artistic 
forms is intrinsic to this cultural heritage. Regular materialisation in appropriate ritual 
practice is part of the obligations entailed by custodianship of particular Dreaming sites. 
 
But what is the relation of the processes of technical reproducibility to a culture that 
is renewed and replicated by the oral transmission of knowledge as well as by 
continual graphic inscription?  Granted there is an inherent emphasis upon 
reproducibility in Aboriginal culture, but is it of the same kind as technical 
reproducibility?  
 
Benjamin notes that one of the characteristic features of the cult value of a work or an 
image is that it becomes evident only in being kept secret or hidden (das Kunstwerk 
im Verborgenen zu halten).53  Cult maintains itself in concealment, thus unveiling is 
accorded a specific presence in time and space (das Hier und Jetzt des Kunstwerks), 
“its unique existence at the place where it happens to be.”54 The quality of cultic 
ritual both is its unapproachability (Unnahbarkeit)—that is, its partitioning and 
isolating—and (literally) its “here and now-ness.”  For Benjamin, however, this “here 
and now” is “imbedded in the fabric of tradition,” which incorporates all manner of 
changes in the ritual, in and of its object(s) and of its owners/custodians.  Cult draws 
together this potentially disparate possibility as it bestows tradition with the veil of 
coherence. 
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Being immersed in the coherence of tradition (in dem Zusammenhang der Tradition), 
for Benjamin, means being immersed in “something thoroughly alive, something 
exceptionally changeable.” 55  This coherence is conveyed by a sense of presence that 
allows (literally) a “holding together” (Zusammenhang).  “Authenticity” is, however, 
for Benjamin, “the sum of all that is transmissible from its provenance, including 
everything from its material duration to the history it has endured.” 56 Authenticity 
derives from the object’s historical testimony, which constitutes its sensitive 
nucleus—a nucleus that is channeled by cult into specific moments of unveiling.  
Exhibition value, by contrast, amounts to the exposing of the inherent divisibility of 
this accumulated core, which is really a retinue of all that has been transmitted and all 
that has been lost.  Exhibition value, found in its characteristic form as the 
reproducible work, by contrast, amounts to an approachability in dispersal; that is, in 
extension beyond a single, specific “here and now”, in the exposing of the 
accumulated transformations that, for Benjamin, is characteristic of the authenticity 
of the work of art.  The exhibiting, reproducible object never holds together in the 
same manner as the ritualized, cultic entity.  It is not anchored to the specific 
unveiling in time and space.  Exhibition value is constituted in an extended unveiling, 
a more or less constitutive wrenching that possesses no genuine moment at all.  
Rather than the face to face oral transaction of information in ritual occasions, 
exhibition denotes a more anonymous, distended engagement with an audience of the 
uninitiated.  
 
How are we to comprehend these processes—and the contemporary manifestations of 
these processes in the form of “contemporary Aboriginal art”—an art which impels a 
disjunction between traditional ritual and contemporary expression, yet nonetheless 
enhances, sometimes even helps revive, ceremonial practice and understanding?  If 
there is an elusive “meaning” in contemporary Aboriginal art, then Michaels asserts 
(as does Johnson) that it does not derive from a constituent template transposed 
directly from ceremonial ritual.  At the same time, though, Michaels rejects the 
aesthetic response to such work.  The aesthetic judgement, he insists, “must always—
ultimately—be exposed as fraud” in relation to Aboriginal art.  This is because, he 
argues, “good” Aboriginal art does not aim to convince, but seeks to “appeal to the 
assent of the other.” 57 The aesthetic judgement discriminates because it distinguishes 
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between “Dreamings” on the basis of “art”.  It brings a foreign mode of evaluation to 
the culture, but one that Aboriginal artists nonetheless seek to negotiate.  
 
If Michaels is correct, then apprehension can be the only adequate response to the 
advent of contemporary Aboriginal art.  The non-initiated viewer can have no secure 
basis of assessment for the work—it does not present an ethnographic core sample, or 
a wholly aesthetic form to be judged disinterestedly.  Aboriginal artists and 
communities, on the other hand, can never secure the effects that their contemporary 
works generate.  There can be no adequate calculation of its diverse appearances, 
contexts and contaminations (market, artistic, religious or otherwise).  The adequate 
response must therefore be apprehensive for one is never certain of what is being 
grasped.  An appeal to the assent of the other is proffered; that is all.  The 
ethnographic or aesthetic explanation will not suffice, though clearly its reception is 
conditioned by an awkward and ill-resolved exotic-aesthetic mélange.  
 
If Aboriginal cultural expression pivots upon processes of inscription, in founding 
and re-founding traditional Law (the Dreaming), then what does contemporary 
Aboriginal art inscribe? Around what is it founded and to what does it commit itself?  
 
The characteristic of media forged by exhibition value and technical reproducibility is 
that they accentuate processes of mass transmission.  They may do so by separating 
and splicing moments, by transporting and resituating forms in a fashion that cannot 
be fully accommodated—particularly for a culture forged upon a complex network of 
reciprocal exchange and face to face transmission.  Exhibition value or technical 
reproducibility does not amount to the simple unveiling of the underlying 
disparateness of history, or of the undercurrents of historical testimony.  It does not 
amount to exposure as clarity.  Its effect is akin to shock for it induces dislocation—a 
dislocation of contiguous relationships by a de-localising process that elicits new 
locations.  Dislocation elicits new locations, which can in turn be reconstituted 
again—the process constitutes “a mass movement of collection and dispersion, of 
banding and disbanding.”   If shock is one characteristic affect, it is felt in both a 
traumatic incursion and its defensive warding off. 58 The dead can return 
unexpectedly, at an inopportune time; “increasing public presentability” means that 
Aboriginal culture has to develop many backgrounding techniques as well as to forge 
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new models of reciprocity in a process that does not permit a mutual, contained 
transmission. 
 
Contemporary Aboriginal cultural production aims to convey a living continuity—to 
allow for the persistence, as well as the reconstitution, of frameworks of cultural 
maintenance, of care for the land and for the Law.  Such work attests both to living 
continuity (care, maintenance) and to what is heterogeneous to it, as well as its 
displacement—the displacement of the ab origine—of being placed outside its 
culture and of defining itself otherwise.59  It seeks its way in the effort to maintain, to 
stay the same as well as in the striving to embrace the heterogeneous, to seek 
modifications in order to negotiate that embrace, to prosper as “contemporary”.  
Contemporary Aboriginal art finds its way today by drawing upon the inherent 
reproducibility of its traditional Law—the “Dreaming”—and, thus, by eliciting its 
mechanical reproducibility.   
 
Its magical performance in delivering the ancient and the contemporary serves as a 
compensatory requirement in a climate in which, as Derrida suggests, the “technical 
experience tends to become more animistic, magical, mystical.”  Yet it is not certain 
that this affinity can provide adequate compensation for this is the tele-
technoscientific space in which “one increasingly uses artifacts and protheses of 
which one is totally ignorant, in a growing disproportion between knowledge and 
know-how…” 60  This breach might indicate that the apprehensive response and the 
exotic explanation may never be too far removed.  Aboriginal art and its cultural 
production in general, seek to inhabit this impossible space in an attempt to appeal to 
the assent of the other.  Aboriginal art differs from other contemporary art in one 
essential feature—it asks of its audience to show care and respect for its culture and 
way of life.  It is at once an impossible claim for there are no structures to secure it.  
Yet, contemporary Aboriginal art places its faith in a response from a non-initiated 
viewer invited to take care, to participate in responsibility for this culture and its 
beliefs.  That is why the most consistent claim of Aboriginal artists concerns the 
value and centrality of the Dreaming and the accompanying value of that inscription.  
This does not amount to a claim about the primordial coherence of the inscription, but 
it does concern the continued importance of that very act of inscription.  It is 
impossible for it can never be secure because such inscription falls beyond any 
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parameter of guarantee and beyond the protocols and strictures of the initiated.  
Furthermore, the mode of this engagement is not quite as Michaels suggested of 
seeing through the eyes of its culture “as well as those of the world.”  It is more an 
engagement delivered in the mode of a flash, a snap or a blink than an eye-to-eye, 
face-to-face transmission. 61  It is an apprehensive engagement, both wrenched and 
wrenching; nonetheless, this is how Aboriginal art seeks to convey the continuity of 
its difference, and difference of its continuity to the uninitiated.  
 
Andrew McNamara 
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